Engineering Trust for Software-Defined Mobility

Cybersecurity work exists as documentation rather than engineering decisions.

• • TARA documentation
• • Cybersecurity goals
• • Cybersecurity concept

TARA results differ between teams because the method is applied inconsistently.

• • Item definition
• • Asset and damage scenario register
• • Threat scenarios and attack paths

Security controls are specified but never tested against a capable attacker.

• • Test plan and agreed scope
• • Reproducible finding records with severity
• • Attack path documentation

Vehicle data is collected but no one owns detection or response.

• • VSOC concept and operating model
• • Detection use-case catalogue
• • Triage and escalation procedures

Update processes exist in engineering but are not documented as a managed system.

• • SUMS process documentation
• • Update security control specification
• • Impact assessment procedure

Security requirements are written but not implementable on the target hardware.

• • Embedded security design
• • Key management concept
• • Configuration guidance for AUTOSAR security modules

Safety and security teams produce conflicting requirements.

• • HARA support documentation
• • Safety goals and requirements
• • Functional safety concept input

V2V and C-V2X work in India is treated as a radio or ITS feature, with AIS-230 cybersecurity left until late.

• • India V2V/C-V2X security scope and OBU item definition
• • Threat analysis and risk treatment decisions for V2X interfaces
• • Cybersecurity goals and technical requirements for AIS-230-oriented readiness

Generic security training does not transfer to vehicle engineering work.

• • Curriculum aligned to roles
• • Training material and exercises
• • Workshop outcomes and action items